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"MEET THE NEW Boss . . . "*
ALAN

K.

CHENt

As my colleagues and I met during the early stages of planning the
conference at which many of these papers were presented, the conversation
turned toward the possibilities of a burgeoning jurisprudential movement or
development loosely labeled "The New Private Law." The topic was derived
from a series of discussions about the emerging contemporary political movement toward (or resurrection of) privatization, spurred in part by the 1994
congressional elections and the Republican Party's so-called "Contract With
America."' Perhaps, some argued, this political movement might reflect, or
could be said to be the antecedent to, a broader, parallel transformation in
jurisprudential thought.
Other topics were discussed, but with increasing enthusiasm, many of my
colleagues began to see a pattern emerge that, at least for me, was not evident.
As several of the contributors to this issue have acknowledged, the tendency to
alternate between public and private provision and regulation of public goods
(or some combination thereof) has enjoyed a long and cyclical history in our
legal and political culture.2 Being one of the more cynical (or perhaps least
imaginative) of the group, in the midst of an exchange on these issues I muttered, "Meet the new boss, same as the old boss,"3 a familiar line from a song

* PETE TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO'S NEXT (Decca 1971).
t Assistant Professor, University of Denver College of Law. B.A., Case Western Reserve
University, 1982; J.D., Stanford University Law School, 1985. Thanks to all of the participants
from other law schools who contributed so meaningfully to this Symposium: Mary Becker, Rick
Collins, Dan Farber, Clayton Gillette, Gary Peller, Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Elaine Welle, and
Sheryl Scheible-Wolf. Their creative and interesting ideas, both at the conference and in their
papers, helped me immensely in formulating and clarifying my own thoughts on the New Private
Law. I would especially like to thank my colleagues at the University of Denver, Fred Cheever,
Roberto Corrada, Nancy Ehrenreich, Martha Ertman, Dennis Lynch, Julie Nice, and Celia Taylor,
who conceived and put together a fascinating conference and symposium. Dean Lynch also deserves credit, along with the University of Denver College of Law, for the continuing support and
encouragement for the Denver University Law Review Symposium. Many of the aforementioned
also read and commented on a draft of this essay, as did David Barnes, George Martinez, Steve
Pepper, and Bob Weisberg. Faculty Services Librarian Diane Burkhardt, my assistant Leslie
Pagett, and research assistant Wendy Hess also helped me immeasurably in conducting research.
Finally, the symposium would not have been possible without the superior effort of Law Review
editors Sue Chrisman and Tracy Craige and their staff.
1. GOP's "Contract with America", STAR-TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Nov. 9, 1994, at
14A. The Republican Party's Contract With America symbolizes a political commitment to decentralize power and to "end ... government that is too big, too intrusive and too easy with the
public's money." Id.
2. See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Opting Out of Public Provision,73 DENy. U. L. REV. 1185
(1996); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The
Yellow Dog Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996).
3. PETE TowNsHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, on WHO'S NEXT (Decca 1971) [hereinafter
TowNsHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again]. Another possibility, of course, is that I am simply our
faculty's most dedicated fan of The Who.
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by the rock group, The Who. My comment was meant not to be flippant, but
to reflect my initial impression that the topic we were examining was a recycled version or aspect of the public/private distinction, which has been
exhaustively and insightfully explored by adherents of existing jurisprudential
schools.
Over the course of several months, I began to understand more of what
my colleagues saw. The prospect of a new jurisprudential framework was
seductive. Yet I remained skeptical about what we were actually examining,
often invoking The Who's lyrics as shorthand for my doubt.
This essay raises a few challenges for the believers in the New Private
Law and questions what defining characteristics this new school of legal
thought might be said to bear. It draws in large part from the lyrics of Won't
Get Fooled Again, The Who's anthem of youthful dissatisfaction4 from which
I initially drew my cynical comments. The selection of this theme is not facetious (and only partly humorous).' That song has long sounded the tones of
disillusionment and was released at a time in our political culture when many
on the political left were soured by the unfulfilled, yet seductive, promises of
meaningful political change.6 Now, as substantial changes in the political climate toward the right have emerged, while those on the left simultaneously
begin to embrace context-specific forms of private governance, it seems appropriate to return to the wisdom the song's lyrics offer to intellectual inquiry
Its critical tone is surely appropriate for exploring, with some skepticism, a
symposium dedicated to the proposition that a new jurisprudential movement
is afoot.
To be sure, none of the papers published here unequivocally contends that
a new jurisprudential movement has arisen. Yet this important conceptual
question is implicit in the work produced here.' While each of the papers in

4. Cf. MICK JAGGER & KEITH RICHARD, Satisfaction, on OUT OF OUR HEADS (London
1965).
5. Cf. Jim Chen, But Cf ... Rock 'N' Roll Law School, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1995)
(assembling, in a humorous fashion, various rock lyrics to demonstrate their explanatory power
regarding multiple constitutional law doctrines).
6. See generally JOHN ORMAN, THE POLmCS OF ROCK MUSIC 160 (1984) (noting that Pete
Townshend's Won't Get Fooled Again "warned people not to follow the new revolutionary leaders
and the rhetoric of the movement because everyone got fooled by those leaders and gurus in the
1960's").
7. For a different view, see Chen, supra note 5, at 318 (arguing that "Pete Townshend
might be able to see for miles, but not when it comes to constitutional law") (footnotes omitted).
8. Our collective thought process is explained in somewhat more detail by Julie Nice. Julie
A. Nice, The New Private Law: An Introduction, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 993 (1996). Whether recent trends toward privatization are described as a political trend, a legal development, or a jurisprudential movement, it is incumbent upon those who identify it as "new" to describe exactly
what it is. In my view, it was at least implicit that a new school of legal thought could be associated with the various modes of private governance examined here. Indeed, our topic was selfconsciously modeled, at least in part, on the exploration of jurisprudential change surrounding the
New Public Law in the Michigan Law Review. See Symposium, The New Public Law, 89 MICH.
L. REV. 707 (1991). Martha Ertman and Roberto Corrada argue that there is at least a possibility
that the New Private Law is associated with a transformation in legal thought. Martha M. Ertman,
ContractualPurgatoryfor Sexual Marginorities:Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L.
REV. 1107, 1161-67 (1996); Roberto L. Corrada, Claiming Private Law for the Left: Exploring
Gilmer's Impact and Legacy, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1051, 1055-65 (1996). Fred Cheever maintains
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this Symposium represents an important, creative contribution to the scholarly
literature and to the discourse on privatization, I argue in this essay that collectively they do not represent and are not characterized by any new jurisprudential framework or perspective. Rather, they can easily be fit into existing
modes of legal thought and intellectual discourse. Drawing from some of these
papers, I explore three possibilities of how the New Private Law could conceivably be characterized as a new jurisprudential movement, but conclude
that none of these characteristics makes the New Private Law new.
I. LINER NoTEs
A natural starting point for any serious inquiry along these lines should be
an examination of what constitutes a jurisprudential movement or school of
thought. While this is a daunting task whose scope far exceeds the ambition of
this essay, I must at least stake out some basic ground rules for my arguments.
Several identifying characteristics come to mind. First, we could characterize a jurisprudential movement as an analytical tool or set of tools for the
comprehensive examination or critique of a system of law that contributes
meaningfully to our understanding of that system.9 Another necessary characteristic of a new jurisprudential framework is that it should probably offer
some explanatory power, either as a descriptive or normative matter. 0 That
is, it should be useful in identifying in some systematic way why legal problems are, or should be, resolved in a particular manner. A jurisprudential
school must also offer a distinctive analytical approach to looking at legal
problems and differ in important respects from existing schools of thought."
Both traditional and contemporary schools of legal thought share these
basic characteristics. Early classical Formalist and Conceptualist traditions in

that in the conservation easements context, the unique blending of public and private mechanisms
of land use regulation creates some sort of "magic." Federico Cheever, Public Good and Private
Magic in the Law of Land Trusts and Conservation Easements: A Happy Present and a Troubled
Future, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (1996). Nancy Ehrenreich, however, limits her observations to the possibilities that a traditionally conservative tool might be used not only to achieve
progressive ends, but also to undermine conventional discourse about the social construction of
"choice," thus generating a more substantive public policy discourse. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1235, 1251 (1996)
9. ROBERT L. HAYMAN, JR. & NANCY LEVIT, JURISPRUDENCE: CONTEMPORARY READINGS,
PROBLEMS, AND NARRATIVES 6 (1995) ("Jurisprudence encompasses the study of a legal system's
scope, function, methodology, and guiding precepts. It considers the basic, general, universal and
theoretical ideas of law, as well as their underlying premises."); see also Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 0to ST. L.J. 599, 638 (1989) (describing the common
feature of Law and Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Feminist Legal Theory as attempting to
develop a new theoretical approach that analyzes law "across the board"); Peter M. Shane, Structure, Relationship, Ideology, or, How Would We Know a "New Public Law" If We Saw It?, 89
MICH. L. REV. 837, 840-41 (1991) (arguing that one characteristic of a new jurisprudential movement is that it be recognized as new from multiple perspectives). Minda describes Law and Economics as "purport[ing] to offer a new theoretical framework for systematically describing and
reformulating adjudication and legal decisionmaking." See, e.g., Minda, supra at 604.
10. HAYMAN & LEVrT, supra note 9, at 6 (arguing that the "essential questions" of jurisprudence "can be of a positive or descriptive nature or of a suggestive or normative nature").
11. Id. at 7 (describing a "contemporary" school of jurisprudence as "one which can meaningful be differentiated both from the schools that dominated an earlier age and from the other
schools of today").
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American legal thought sought to characterize law and adjudication in categorical, quasi-scientific terms, promising that deductive reasoning from basic
principles would lead to determinate outcomes. 2 The hallmarks of this classical school were the embracing of formal logic to derive legal decisions from
broad, general principles or truths. 3 The Legal Realists reacted to the classical tradition, creating a distinct conceptual framework that questioned the existence of "right" answers to hard legal questions, undermined assumptions of
judicial objectivity, and called for the introduction of social science and other
sources of knowledge external to law to create a better understanding of
law. 4 The Realists also viewed law as an instrumental or utilitarian device,
an appropriate vehicle for social change. 5 Some of them sought to question
the fundamental dividing line between law and politics.
The Legal Process school, in turn, rejected many of the Realists' conceptions, looking back to a more hopeful vision of "neutral principles."' 6 Process
theorists emphasized the ideals of the legal decisionmaking process and the
confinement of legal institutions (courts, legislatures, agencies) to roles within
their competence, rather than normative outcomes. 7 As one description
offers:
The legal process synthesis was a brilliant achievement, for it transcended the realist/formalist debate in a way that fit well with the
relativist theory of democracy. The scholars were able to marginalize
Lochner-style constitutional law as impermissible value-imposition by
unelected judges while simultaneously moving mainstream American
jurisprudence into the modern era by acknowledging and legitimating
the inescapably political character of the common law, statutory interpretation, and administrative law. In short, legal process asserted the
illegitimacy of activist judicial review while asserting activism in
virtually all other institutional settings. 8

12.

See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Mod-

eration as a Postmodern Cultural Form, 89 MICH. L. REv. 707, 711-12 & n.5 (1991) (providing a

slightly broader definition of formalism); Minda, supra note 9, at 633-34 (describing Realist reaction to mechanical jurisprudence of the Formalist and Conceptualist schools). The descriptions of
jurisprudential schools in this section are necessarily abbreviated and incomplete, yet in providing
them I seek to capture some of the characteristics that allow us to view them as distinct.
13. HAYMAN & LEvrr, supra note 9, at 11-12.
14. See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1949); Karl N. Llewelyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence--The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930).
15. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 688-89 (2d ed. 1985) ("Real-

ist judges and writers were openly instrumental; they asked: what use is this doctrine or rule?...
Law had to be a working social tool; and it had to be seen in that light.").
16. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 19-20 (1959) (arguing that the courts' interpretation of the Constitution must rest on
"reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved"). The foremost Legal Process thinkers were, of course, Professors Hart and Sacks. HENRY
M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).

17. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 746 (noting that the legal process school "celebrated
the neutrality of law"); Minda, supra note 9, at 642 ("A major tenet of [Legal Process] school was
to provide an objective 'process' determined by legitimate procedures and proper institutions for
resolving subjective questions of 'public policy."').
18. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 723.
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Three of the widely-acknowledged contemporary legal schools-Law and
Economics, Critical Legal Studies, and Feminist Jurisprudence-also offer
distinctive and different analytical approaches to the system of law. The Law
and Economics school, for example, can be viewed as a systematic approach
to describing or prescribing legal rulemaking as a means of achieving individual and social wealth maximization.' 9 Through the lens of classical economic
theory, Law and Economics proponents seek to understand law as reliant on
the rational behavior of individuals to maximize their personal utility." The
aggregation of these preferences, in turn, is seen as maximizing societal welfare." On this understanding, legal rules can be described or criticized with
reference to their success in promoting these economic objectives.
The Critical Legal Studies (CLS) movement, in contrast, has attempted to
develop "a totalistic critique of legal doctrine."22 CLS scholars focus on the
indeterminacy of legal doctrine and on the ways in which doctrine masks ideological forces that perpetuate hierarchical social structures.23 From this perspective, law and legal doctrine are viewed as obfuscating forces, hiding the
ideological and socially and historically contingent forces that truly underlie
law. 4 In pursuing this enterprise, CLS seeks to import perspectives from other disciplines, using "different nonlegal methodologies and insights.""
Feminist legal theorists, too, take critical perspectives, but examine law
and the legal system from the perspective of exposing its historically male
orientation. 6 On one account, the objective of Feminist Legal Theory "is to
explain how the law subordinates women by relying upon theoretical distinctions which are both reified and ordered to favor male interests and values
over those of women. 27
While these modem jurisprudential movements are surely diverse, they
share the common feature of promoting comprehensive analytical or critical
approaches to law that are distinct from the Formalist, Realist, and Process
traditions.2"
Moreover, when groups of legal scholars have attempted to define a break
from the past toward a new jurisprudential vision, they have sought to identify
the characteristics or perspectives that mark the new "school's" territory.

19. Minda, supra note 9, at 605. The work of this movement, in a broad sense, is characterized by Richard Posner's work. See Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,Economics, and Legal
Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).

20. HAYMAN & LEvrr, supra note 9, at 95.
21. Id. at 96.

22. Minda, supra note 9, at 614. See generally MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 1-14 (1987); Mark G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984); Symposium,
Critical Legal Studies, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984).
23. See HAYMAN & LEVIT, supra note 9, at 213-14.
24. Id. at 214-15.
25. Minda, supra note 9, at 614; see also HAYMAN &
scribing CLS as "a significantly interdisciplinary enterprise").
26.

LEVIT,

supra note 9, at 215 (de-

CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 161-62, 237-

38 (1989).
27. Minda, supra note 9, at 625.
28. See Id. at 638-41.
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Several years ago, the Michigan Law Review published a symposium attempting to classify a new school labeled "The New Public Law." 9 While commentators differed over the precise definition of New Public Law, the appellation can be loosely defined as an amalgam of widely diverse post-Legal Process scholarship advanced during the 1970s and 1980s, with a decided centrist
bent away from the ideologically polar Law and Economics and CLS movements.
In their essay on the New Public Law, William Eskridge and Gary Peller
placed the New Public Law in the context of the intellectual history of American legal thought.3 0 Their contribution to the Michigan symposium described
three different accounts of the emergence of New Public Law scholarship.
From one view, the New Public Law could be seen as an improvement on or
refinement of the basic structures of the Legal Process tradition-a sort of
"new legal process."'" From this perspective, contemporary scholarship refined Legal Process thought by shaping it to respond to new problems, to new
theories and information, and to the attacks from Law and Economics and the
CLS movement.32 It did so by engaging extralegal sources and other academic disciplines, such as civic republicanism, theology, feminism, hermeneutics,
pragmatism, and public choice theory.33
A second account of the New Public Law was the "conscious rejection of
the pluralist political features of legal process theory."34 On this view, the
New Public Law was a reaction to the concerns of an increasingly diverse
group among left-leaning scholars who viewed the legitimacy of law as relating to its normative content, considered law to be a powerful transformative
force that creates, more than it responds to, society, and understood the process of law to be a practical, dialogic discourse that seeks to reconcile, rather
than to impose, public values.33
Finally, Eskridge and Peller argued that the New Public Law could be
viewed as a contemporary response to the critiques of Legal Process launched
by the Law and Economics movement on the right, and CLS on the left.36 In
this sense, it can be seen as a mediating force to reconcile the polarization of
academic discourse in the 1970s and 1980s. 37
In that same symposium, Dan Farber and Phillip Frickey attempted to
characterize the New Public Law as a noteworthy departure from mainstream
legal theory. They maintained that "[o]ne of [the] most distinctive attributes
[of this school] ... is the much more careful and explicit attention granted to
political theory."38 The New Public Law scholarship, they maintained, can be

29. Supra note 8.
30. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12.
31. Id. at 709-37.
32. Id. at 727.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 737.
35. Id. at 737-61.
36. Id. at 726-28.
37. Id. at 709.
38. Daniel A. Farber & Philip R. Frickey, In the Shadow of the Legislature: The Common
Law in the Age of the New Public Law, 89 MICH. L. REV. 875, 877 (1991).
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characterized by its attention to informing legal discourse by reference to two
distinct, but arguably adverse, political theories-public choice theory and neorepublicanism. 9
Peter Shane played the skeptic's role in the New Public Law symposium,
thoughtfully articulating some important points about the essentially interpretive nature of assessing paradigm shifts in legal thought." He identified several reference points for the task of interpreting what is new. First, he claimed
that an initial task in assessing change is identifying an appropriate baseline
from which the law had moved." Second, Professor Shane proposed that
identifiable jurisprudential movements might entail "a theory of the state" that
differs from the theory of the state during the baseline period.42 A theory of
the state is a "widespread understanding of the relationship of the state to its
citizens, of official institutions to one another, or of the core purposes of government activity."43 While debatable, application of this standard allows for
distinction between long-term jurisprudential transformation and short-term
political shifts that may not have an enduring impact." Professor Shane ultimately concluded that the New Public Law, while feeling new, represented
continuity rather than innovation. 5
Again, the common feature of these descriptions is that they attempted to
locate a potentially new movement in historical and political context and
define how it both inherits and departs from existing or recognized intellectual
traditions. In contrast, none of the work in this Symposium successfully
attempts to situate the New Private Law in this manner; moreover, it is difficult to infer comprehensive analytical approaches from the interesting doctrinal
issues generated by these articles.'
II. "THE CHANGE, IT HAD TO COME, WE KNEW IT ALL ALONG"

47

The New Private Law, as described to differing degrees in the essays in
this Symposium, is an attempt to describe the possibilities of, and concerns
with, new forms of private governance-i.e., of regulating and promoting the
conduct of individuals in the acquisition and distribution of public goods. '
Capturing the traditional rhetoric of the "market," the contemporary privatization movement suggests that market-driven behavior may be preferable to

39.
40.

Id.
Shane, supra note 9, at 837-38.

41.

Id. at 838-39.

42.
43.

Id. at 839-40.
Id. at 840.

44.

Id.

45. Id. at 873-74.
46. It is noteworthy that throughout the historical shifts in broader legal thought, the public/private distinction has enjoyed a dubious history. Indeed, one could invert Martha Ertman's
horseshoe arc from public rights to public condemnation to form a pendulum, symbolizing the
alternating visions of public and private spheres of governance as "good" or "bad" for left or
right. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1111. The private sphere was viewed as privileged under classical
legal thought, subordinate in Realist and Process theory, and indistinct from the public sphere in
the modern movements. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 717 & Table 1.
47.

TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.

48.

Where I refer to "public goods," I mean also to include public services and public rights.
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traditional distribution of scarce resources through the ordinary political, process. Privileging individual autonomy and choice in particular contexts may
constitute a superior mode of delivering public goods and protecting them
from encroachment.
Of course, private governance can have many different meanings. An
earlier view of private law arose from the classical legal Formalist conception
of private economic ordering, symbolized both historically and conceptually by
the Supreme Court's decision in Lochner v. New York.49 On this view, private decisionmakers, governed by market forces, allocate resources free from
state intrusion, while public institutions represent a sort of backstop to protect
personal liberty only to the extent that the market has been distorted or altered
in some unnatural way.5" In this sense, private acquisition and allocation of
resources is privileged because contract and property rights are "natural" or
prepolitical. 5"
This view reflected the Formalist conception of the public/private distinction, under which the private sphere could be conceptually separated from the
public because of this natural rights based conception of property and contract
as a fundamental liberty.52 Beginning with the Realists, however, legal observers attacked the sharp division between public and private spheres, noting
that all property-based rights were themselves the product of public choices
made by the state at an earlier time.53 This conception challenged the idea
that any right existed except by virtue of the state. Scholars from the CLS
movement took the critique further, arguing that not only was the public/private distinction conceptually indefensible, but also that it was an obscuring mechanism through which the state could permit individuals to believe that
their choices were private, when in fact all choices are the product of some
previous state action.54
What are the "new" forms of private governance that have emerged in late
twentieth century legal and political thought, and how do they differ from the
more traditional conceptions of private ordering described above? Three general models come to mind, each reflected to some degree by essays in this Sym55
posium.

49. 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905) (holding that state law regulating wages and working conditions
of bakery employees constituted unconstitutional deprivation of due process of law by interfering
with liberty of contract).
50. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 711-12.
51. For a critical view of this understanding, see Cass R. Sunstein, Naked Preferences and
the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1697, 1718 (1984) (arguing that the theoretical basis
for the Lochner decision is undermined when one recognizes that the market status quo is itself
the product of previous governmental choices).
52. Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Casenote on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1296, 1299-1300 (1982) (describing natural rights regime under which individual contractual and property rights are immune from state regulation).
53. See generally Duncan Kennedy, The Stages of Decline of the Public/Private Distinction,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1351-52 (1982) (describing the collapse of the public/private distinction); see also Sunstein, supra note 51, at 1697, 1718.
54. Professor Ehrenreich summarizes this position in her essay. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at
1239-40.
55. Cf. JoHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIzATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS
7-8 (1989) (establishing four models for the delivery of services, depending upon two vari-
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First, there is a contractual delegation model, under which a private group
maintains power by virtue of delegation from the state. An early and traditional focus of privatization has been a system under which the government merely enters into a contract with a private business entity to perform a function
traditionally performed in the past exclusively, or predominantly, by the government.5 6 Under this model, the private actors are likely to take on the essential attributes of the traditional state, but private entrepreneurship is said to
provide a better vehicle for delivery of traditionally government-provided
services. This model relies upon a faith in economic incentives to create and
benefit both private and public welfare. Two typical examples involve contracting with private entities to operate schools or prisons, but there are countless others.
In the educational context, private entrepreneurs have undertaken a national movement to develop alternatives to public schools. The most high profile
of these endeavors, The Edison Project, has recently taken hold in some jurisdictions.57 The federal government is, at the same time, encouraging state and
local governments to experiment with school privatization." s In the case of
correctional institutions, a common political response to the increasing costs
and problems associated with state-run prisons and jails has been to turn their
operation over to the private sector.59
Government agencies have a long tradition of contracting or subcontracting out certain aspects of their public functions to the private sector. In both
the educational and correctional contexts, however, it is difficult to ascertain
what is exactly new about such approaches. The idea of privatizing schools, in
one form or another, has existed for as long as the public school system has
been a predominant societal presence.' And, of course, private schools have
always existed as alternatives to public school systems. Moreover, the

ables-who pays and who delivers; the four models are collective payment/public sector delivery;
collective payment/private sector delivery; individual payment/public sector delivery; individual
payment/private sector delivery).
56. The government may delegate a previously public function to a private entity in the form
of statutory authorization or contract, or some combination thereof. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §
17-1-104.4 (1996 Cum. Supp.) (authorizing state department of corrections to consider proposals
for provision of minimum security beds through contracts at facilities operated by nonstate entities); COLO. REV. STAT. § 17-1-202 (1996 Cum. Supp.) (authorizing state department of corrections to entertain proposals from private contractors for construction and operation of prison facilities).
57. Peter Applebome, Edison Project Getting Good Grades, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1996, at
A02 (describing Edison Project schools in four states).
58. A few years ago, Congress enacted the Goals 2000: Educate America Act, which included a provision authorizing state educational agencies to use federal funds to support "activities
relating to the planning of, and evaluation of, projects under which local educational agencies or
schools contract with private management organizations to reform a school." Pub. L. No. 103-227,
§ 308(b)(2)(J), 108 Stat. 125 (1994) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 5888(b)(2)(J) (1996)).
59. See Symposium, Privatizationof Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 813 (1987); Susan L. Kay,
The Implications of Prison Privatizationon the Conduct of Prisoner Litigation Under 42 U.S.C.
Section 1983, 40 VAND. L. REV. 867 (1987); Ira P. Robbins, Privatizationof Prisons: An Analysis
of the State Action Requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, 20
CONN. L. REV. 835 (1988); E.S. Savas, Privatization and Prisons, 40 VAND. L. REV. 889, 890-93
(1987) (reporting statistics on privatization of public services in the United States).
60. See ALEX MOLNAR, GIVING
AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 1-2, 9, 39 (1996).
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common rhetorical contentions that contemporary school privatization advocates have asserted are remarkably similar to the school privatization arguments that emerged at the beginning of this century.6' Similar rhetorical choruses are sounded in the private prison movement, which is also not a particularly new idea.62 In that context, the increasing contractualization of prison
services has raised relatively mundane issues about agency principles, albeit
agency principles in the context of state action.63 Moreover, critics of the
privatization of traditional government services raise comparably conventional
critiques.'
Gary Peller's essay" reflects the New Private Law contractual delegation
model, which is somewhat analogous to the "public function" model of the
state action doctrine.' Professor Peller contends that there might exist in the
New Private Law movement a potential for a progressive vision that facilitates
the recapture of popular control over institutions such as schools now run by
elite, unresponsive bureaucrats.67 Under one privatization scheme, school districts could subcontract out the administration of their school systems to private corporations. Under this fairly conventional view, corporate entities might
be more responsive to parents and students than public school administrators
because the former must react to market concerns or go out of business.' A
more radical proposal would be to turn schools over to the private market.
Providing for "auctioning" of public schools to private community groups that
might advance their particularized interests or emphases could generate opportunities for institutions that would not, or perhaps could not, exist under the
traditional, top-down public management of education.' For example, in an

61.

Id.

62.

Ward M. McAfee, Tennesee's Private Prison Act of 1986: An Historical Perspective

with Special Attention to California'sExperience, 40 VAND. L. REV. 851, 852 & n.6 (1987) (discussing nineteenth century experience of several states in allowing private companies to operate
state prisons).
63.

See, e.g., West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 56 (1988) ("Contracting out prison medical care

does not relieve the State of its constitutional duty to provide adequate medical treatment to those
in its custody, and it does not deprive the state's prisoners of the means to vindicate their Eighth
Amendment rights."). Perhaps it is overstating the case to contend that the issues are mundane, as
the Court continues to take cases to clarify these issues. See Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct.
504 (1996) (order granting certiorari on whether employees of private corporations that operate
prisons under government contract are entitled to qualified immunity from constitutional tort
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
64.

MOLNAR, supra note 60, at 178-79, 184 (arguing that private, profit-driven corporations

are not intended to further the public good).
65. See Gary Peller, Public Imperialism and Private Resistance: ProgressivePossibilitiesof
the New Private Law, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1001 (1996).

66. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 504-09 (1946) (holding that privately-owned
"company town" could not constitutionally invoke state trespass laws to interfere with religious
speech). But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison, 419 U.S. 345, 351-53 (1974) (holding that private utility company operating by virtue of government-created monopoly is not a state actor
obligated to comply with constitutional due process guarantees).
67. Peller, supra note 65, at 1005 ("American public schools by and large represent the paradigm of alienating, unresponsive, often corrupt, inefficient, and culturally repressive social institutions.").
68.

Id. at 1007.

69.

Id. at 1008.
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African-American community, commonly interested residents could band together to purchase and operate an Afro-centric school.7"
A second model of private governance might involve joint or cooperative
endeavors by public and private entities. In some circumstances, for example,
the state and private parties have expressly agreed to act jointly or are so
intertwined that the law may not view them as legally distinct.7 None of the
articles in this Symposium suggest a conventional joint enterprise or conspiracy model. Perhaps this should not be surprising, since the forms of New Private Law explored here seem to value the formal separation of public and
private rather than their explicit merger.
Several pieces do, however, suggest a sort of hybrid enterprise model that
signals more than some sort of public/private cooperation. These hybrid proposals envision a third model of privatization under which government may
create, through public law, a scheme that facilitates allocation and distribution
of public goods by a system of private individual transactions. In this category, I place the work of Clayton Gillette, 2 Martha Ertman,73 and Fred
Cheever.74 Somewhat like the government encouragement/approval model of
state action," under this model the state is more of a background player that
consciously makes private transactions possible. The hybrid model suggests
that the concepts of public and private governance lie on a continuum, rather
than at two extreme poles.76
Clayton Gillette examines in great detail the notion that private individuals
and groups might be offered the opportunity to "opt out" of the public provision of many public goods.77 Using the analogy of contractual default rules,
he proposes that public decisions about the distribution of public goods may
serve as a background against which individuals might choose to opt for a
private supplier to either replace or supplement the state's delivery of that
good." In this manner, Professor Gillette envisions a system in which private
entities compete with, rather than replace, public institutions.79 He observes
that the selection of public or private delivery of various public goods

70. Professor Peller offered this example in his oral remarks at the New Private Law conference.
71. See, e.g., Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961) (holding
that privately-owned coffee shop in a publicly-owned building on publicly-owned land was so
closely intertwined with the public that it engaged in state action for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause). But see Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840-42 (1982) (private school that
receives 90% of its funding from government and is closely regulated is not state actor bound by
procedural due process clause).
72. Gillette, supra note 2.
73. Ertman, supra note 8.
74. Cheever, supra note 8.
75. See, e.g., Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1948) (holding that private party's
enforcement in public courts of racially restrictive covenant was state action governed by the
equal protection clause).
76. See Kennedy, supra note 53, at 1352-53 (describing "continuumization" as one stage in
the decline of the public/private distinction).
77. Gillette, supra note 2.
78. Id. at 1188-92. He also suggests that some people might even choose to opt for less than
the default level of public goods. Id. at 1216-18.
79. Id. at 1187.
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implicates complex social choices and costs not accurately depicted by simplistic rhetorical attacks that celebrate the public and demonize the private."
Professors Ertman and Cheever have contributed provocative articles exploring whether the New Private Law may suggest that progressive alternatives to the advancement of public rights may be accomplished in a secondbest form through private ordering and enforcement of private contractual
choices about families and land use, respectively. Martha Ertman argues that if
the law (or politics) will not permit us to achieve full recognition of public
rights for, say, gay marriage, perhaps the New Private Law provides a "subversive" doctrinal opportunity to accomplish politically progressive goals."
She proposes that a contractual model may promote individual choice for sexual marginorities in the same way that traditional contract doctrine is said to
reify economic liberty.82 Fred Cheever's essay on conservation easements
offers similar possibilities for devotees of open space.83 He maintains that the
creation of an elaborate scheme of public incentives to encourage private land
transactions that constrain the development of land provides an opportunity to
accomplish environmental protection that public law does not.84 Both of their
proposals are set against the background of the state, as judicial enforcer of
private contractual obligations and, in Professor Cheever's case, as creator of
the "private" conservation easements interest.
The critical commentaries in this Symposium, in turn, track traditional
concerns about turning government functions over to the private sector. Professors Becker, Stone, and Welle, for example, sound the cautions of the old
boss. Their contributions to this Symposium reflect a profound skepticism
about the private realm. Mary Becker cautions that private contractual regimes
may not always be beneficial for have-nots, and that a more complete analysis
requires the examination of the relative power of the parties to whom the state
allocates the bargaining. 5 Katherine Van Wezel Stone's article highlights the
dangers of allocating dispute resolution in the labor and employment law context to private arbitrators.86 She raises important concerns about undermining
and obscuring public rights under the private regime. Elaine Welle acutely
observes the necessity for consideration of broader public values in establishing a baseline for a "default" level of public services as well as in setting
limits on Professor Gillette's proposal for opting out of public provision of
goods.87

80. Id. at 1193-1216.
81. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1144-53, 1156-58.
82. id. at 1109.
83. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1078-87.
84. Id. at 1086.
85. Mary Becker, Problems with the Privatization of Heterosexuality, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
1169, 1173-75 (1996).
86. Stone, supra note 2, at 1036-43. As Professor Stone's piece underscores, at least you
could sue the old boss in a public and accountable forum.
87. Elaine A. Welle, Opting Out of Public Provision: Constraintsand Policy Considerations,
73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1221, 1226-33 (1996).
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s
. SAME AS THE OLD Boss[?]""

Without acknowledging the existence of a distinct jurisprudential movement, one can surely see something "new" in the papers described above. The
task of identifying a movement, however, must involve more. There must be
deliberation about what it is that makes the analysis new, and how it can be
distinguished from existing analytical frameworks.89
What is new about modem incarnations of private law? Is it the marriage
or partnership of the public and private, and if so, where is the "magic" of
which Fred Cheever speaks?' Is it new simply because it "feels" different?
Will New Private Law be the miracle cure9 for the postmodem blues?
The various authors' intriguing discussions of the possibilities of New
Private Law offer some insights into what might be "new." First, a common
feature of New Private Law seems to be a preference for decentralized, relatively autonomous decisionmaking over issues that previously were the conventional subject of public regulation and public discourse.92 The decentralization of the New Private Law suggests a regime under which goods and resources are allocated and protected in a highly atomistic manner, with "communities" of decreasing size (and, presumably, increasing homogeneity). Thus,
these models each reflect a desire to reallocate power not only by privatizing
it, but also by decentralizing its exercise. Indeed, as I discuss below, it is not
clear to me which is the more important move, privatization or decentralization.
Another connecting feature of the New Private Law is that it is manifested
in ways that reject the left's romanticization of government as the heroic protector of public rights and values.93 On this view, private governance may
offer the proponents of left-leaning social agendas an opportunity to promote
"public" values, rather than to undermine them. As a number of the papers argue, the "New" Private Law need not have a political valence.94
Finally, another element that one could draw from the New Private Law is
that it reflects a new understanding of private law as a liberating or
transformative concept that promotes progressive values in a subversive way.
On this understanding, the New Private Law operates as a tool through which
substantive policy goals can be reached; the newness is reflected in the use of
what might be considered to be the historically "conservative" mechanism of

88.

TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.

89. See Shane, supra note 9, at 838-42 (describing factors to be considered in evaluating
new movements in legal thought).
90. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1078.
91. PETE TOWNSHEND, Miracle Cure, on TOMMY (Decca 1969).
92. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1085-86; Ertman, supra note 8, at 1156-58; Peller, supra note
65, at 1001-03.
93. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1056-57; Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1236-37; Ertman, supra
note 8, at 1144-53; Peller, supra note 65, at 1002.
94. See, e.g., Corrada, supra note 8, at 1054-55. Nancy Ehrenreich discusses this point as
well, but not in the context of arguing that it is indicative of any broader change in legal thought.
Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1242-48.
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privatization.95 In this manner, the very concept of private governance is itself transformed through its cooptation by the left.
In the following discussion, I address and critique each of these possibilities.
A.

"And a Shotgun Sings the Song"96

It could be that the New Private Law represents a different way of looking at institutional power relationships. On this view, the allocation to the
private realm of not only the authority to create and define substantive interests, but also to carry out the procedures that give life to those interests, may
require a new way of looking at these quasi-legal institutions. Traditional understandings of the public and private, or even of their non-distinctness, may
not capture or reflect the underlying transformation of legal institutions that is
occurring.
When commentators speak of private forms of governance, they generally
mean the transfer of decisionmaking authority away from deliberative, theoretically accountable public institutions toward private institutions or individuals.
This requires faith in the market, however defined, to encourage private property and contractual agreements that advance the welfare of the individual
parties and, on some accounts, society itself. To a greater or lesser degree, ihe
New Private Law, as illustrated in various contexts, suggests that the traditional realms of private transactional law offer superior mechanisms for achieving
socially desirable outcomes.
Under the New Private Law regime, then, private transactional choices
replace, in whole or part, governmental decisions. This conceptualization of
the New Private Law centers on the redistribution of power from government
to private lawmakers to allocate goods. It also requires the decentralization of
decisionmaking authority to autonomous "private" decisionmakers who act
through individualized "market" transactions. By definition, then, this angle on
the New Private Law requires a conceptual acceptance of at least some meaningful difference between public and private realms of governance. I offer here
two general critiques of this aspect of the New Private Law as a jurisprudential shift.
First, it seems that the New Private Law, as reflected in this Symposium;
could be better understood as a simple redistribution of existing power or a
shift toward shared power among existing institutions, both public and private.
To the extent this is an accurate characterization, it signals not a jurisprudential transformation, but yet another move in the continual historical alternation
of public and private as the privileged sphere. Accordingly, it is difficult to
see how this differs from the old private law, the classical conception of private rights as privileged that was one hallmark of Formalist legal thought.
Nothing distinguishes the New Private Law from "old" views of privileging
individual choice through private market ordering.97 If one considers the
95.
96.
97.

Ertman, supra note 8, at 1165-67.
TowNsIIENo, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
Brest, supra note 52, at 1299-1300 (describing natural rights regime under which indi-
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universe of authority to allocate public goods, that authority must be distributed among public actors, private actors, or some combination thereof. This
has always been, and always will be, the case. Moreover, it will remain so
even as the institutions themselves are blended or "married" in previously
unforeseen ways.98
That does not, however, alter the notion that the private law realm exists
only as a product of a public regime." The conception of contract and property law as "private" has long been criticized. '°° One fundamental argument
that obliterates the distinction arises from the fact that private law enforcement
must come through the force of the state. The boundaries of "private" law are
governed largely by common law rules, which are themselves developed
through paradigmatic state agents, the courts. Moreover, the private realm of
society is inherently governed by broader public choices. One of the critical
aspects that forms the debate on the public/private distinction is the conception
of what limits, in a liberal state, may be placed on government interference
with "private" conduct.' °'
These arguments translate quite smoothly to the New Private Law as conceived here. Professors Ertman and Cheever argue that private forms of governance may advance public goals in manners that avoid or, more precisely,
circumvent formal government institutions. Clever though it is, Professor
Ertman's model relies upon state involvement to a substantial degree. Private
ordering is only accomplished in a system that permits public enforcement of
these contractual arrangements.' 2 Unless there were some purely private enforcement mechanism, it is the coercive power of the state that makes possible

vidual contractual and property rights are immune from state regulation); Sunstein, supra note 51,
at 1701, 1717 (describing classical understanding of private economic ordering as presumptively
protected from state interference).
98. In examining whether the New Public Law was marked by changing relationships between public and private institutions, Peter Shane argued that despite increasing efforts toward
privatization, "no apparent change has occurred in legal understanding of the scope of either mandatory or permissible private decisionmaking." Shane, supra note 9, at 844. Noting the elusive
dividing line between public and private, Professor Shane observed that even in an era of increased private institutional roles in providing public goods and services, the governing legal
norms that private entities operate against were likely to be drawn from the state. Id.
99. Indeed, a purely private regime could be possible only if no state existed.
100. See, e.g., Morris R. Cohen, Propertyand Sovereignty and The Basis of Contract, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 41, 69, 102 (1933); Robert Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. Sc. Q. 470 (1923); see also Kennedy, supra note 53, at 135152 (describing Cohen's analysis as representing the collapse of the public/private distinction). Of
course, as Larry Alexander has observed in the state action context, to recognize that the distinction between public and private action is conceptually unhelpful is not to say that there are not
still unanswered normative questions about the constitutional limitations on private power. Larry
Alexander, The PubliclPrivateDistinction and Constitutional Limits on Private Power, 10 CONST.
COMMENT. 361, 364-66 (1993). Indeed, there are circumstances in which the public/private distinction is highly relevant to legal outcomes, even if not conceptually coherent.
101. See Robert H. Mnookin, The PubliclPrivate Dichotomy: Political Disagreement and
Academic Repudiation, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (1982).
102. Professor Ertman acknowledges the critique generated by the public/private distinction in
the contractual rights context, but contends that regardless of conceptual impossibilities, the distinction may have "tremendous impact on actual lives." Ertman, supra note 8, at 1120 (acknowledging public/private distinction). This supports, to some extent, my observation that the New
Private Law represents a contemporary exercise in utilitarianism. See infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
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the benefits under the contract. Ultimately, then, the state must still recognize
the rights as enforceable. What is more, whether or not a judge decides to invoke the public policy exception to a contract designed to protect the choices
of autonomous sexual marginorities is also ultimately a public choice. I am
unconvinced that the imprimatur of the "private," through classical contract
doctrine, will necessarily supersede moral judgments in this context." 3 Accordingly, Professor Ertman's jurisprudential move is inherently subject to the
existence of public law as a promoter (through recognition of a public right)
or destroyer (through public policy exception refusals to enforce such contracts) of her way station.
Professor Cheever's model, too, relies on a system of state enforced contractual rights to empower his conservation easements scheme. Moreover, as
he concedes, this scheme is even more reliant on the state as the source of the
"private" right. His substantial reliance on statutory creation of the conservation easement interest and, more importantly, on a government-created'market
for open space lends great weight to the obliteration of the public and private,
not their "marriage."'0 4 Similarly, Professor Gillette's proposal requires a
collective public decision to enable opting out in the first instance while Professor Peller's private school model relies on the state's authorization to sell
off public schools under legislatively controlled conditions.
Furthermore, it is interesting that both Roberto Corrada's and Dennis
Lynch's comments on Professor Stone's paper seem to be directed at the potential social problems associated with allocation of labor and employment
disputes to private decisionmakers. The problem, they suggest, can be alleviated by adopting notions of due process, ensuring impartial decisionmaking
bodies, etc." 5 In other words, the problems can be addressed by making
these private institutions more like public ones! And how would that be
achieved? Presumably, this would occur through legislative action setting the
parameters of "private" labor arbitration.
Professor Corrada attempts a broader argument that the newness of the
New Private Law is reflected in that it "expressly mistrusts public fora and
seeks to enforce private law in private venues."'" He argues that this
disavowment not only of public law, but of public institutions to enforce private law, is a noteworthy departure from the old (i.e., Lochner era) private
law. This account of the New Private Law does not, on reflection, offer anything new. First, Professor Corrada ignores the fact that the private labor arbitration model he explores is itself the product of public choice, federal arbitration law. Second, his attempt to distinguish the New Private Law with reference to the dispute resolution forum seems to be a nod to a conceptual distinction that has proved as unhelpful as the public/private distinction-the substance/procedure distinction. What is happening still represents a reallocation

103. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1158-59 (navigating around morality section).
104. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1091-92.
105. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1065-68; Dennis 0. Lynch, Conceptualizing Forum Selection
as a "Public Good": A Response to Professor Stone, 73 DENY. U. L. REV. 1071, 1072-76 (1996).

106. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1056.
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of existing power from public forums to private forums, and that reallocation
is always subject to change through the public law system. Indeed, the Federal
Arbitration Act even includes an exemption for employment agreements,
though that provision has sometimes been ignored.0 7
Moreover, the cautionary moves of the New Private Lawmakers reveal
that the real concerns here are the underlying social and political values that
are being pursued, and not the particular form of governance. While the proponents are willing to wade into the privatization waters, they are not willing
to dive in. Some of the authors, even the ones who subscribe to privatization
as a progressive tool, envision public law as a backstop against a private world
gone awry."'9 Professor Cheever's proposal, for example, includes an express
recognition that the state must always be in a position to reenter the picture
should the land use restrictions imposed by private ordering become obsolete,
outmoded, or no longer feasible."'9 Thus, the New Private Law contends that
while the public is not necessarily good for progressive interests, public law
should probably always exist to protect society from the potential evils of
private ordering. It is the outcome, rather than the nature of the forum, that is
most important."0
Once these issues are acknowledged, it seems that there is nothing
quintessentially private about the choices made under any of these proposals.
Both the rulemakers and the rule appliers are public. Each of the proposals
necessitates reliance on the coercive power of the state to accomplish these
goals directly, or at least to ensure that private actors facilitate their achievement.
Collectively these critiques fit within existing traditions of legal thought,
and reflect the fact that public and private realms of governance cannot, in the
end, be distinguished. They reveal the New Private Law more as private law
guided by the not-so-invisible hand of state-created regulation and constructs,
rather than as a new theoretical perspective or movement. Moreover, these
critiques are not new. Building upon the Realists, the CLS movement has
largely undermined the public/private distinction as a conceptual matter."'
The New Private Law has not resurrected the distinction.
A second foundational way of addressing the power relationships thesis is
to examine how it mirrors a long-standing traditional jurisprudential problem---countermajoritarian judicial review in a democratic society. In some
ways, the New Private Law may be viewed as the "New Judicial Review" and

107. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 n.2 (1991) (refusing to apply § I of the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994), which exempts employment contracts). A final rebuttal of Professor Corrada's argument arises from the existence of the Gilmer
case itself. Surely it must be recognized that the actual enforcement of the private arbitral process
in that context came from a paradigmatic public institution, the Supreme Court.
108. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1101-02.
109. Id.
110. Cf. Mnookin, supra note 101, at 1435-36 (1982) (describing lawyer-economists' critique
of public/private distinction as contending that "in comparing alternative legal rules, the consequences are what count, no matter what the 'sphere,").
111. For an excellent collection of CLS scholarship on this matter, see Symposium, The PubliclPrivate Distinction, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1289 (1982).
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may therefore be viewed through the same analytical lens. The point of this
discussion is not to critique the New Private Law substantively, but to demonstrate that the reallocation of institutional power it represents is subject to
ready examination using existing analytical tools.
The argument goes like this. The American constitutional scheme necessitates a delicate balance of simultaneously facilitating majoritarian rule and
protecting minority rights. To accomplish this, it is sometimes necessary for a
politically independent legal institution-the courts-to disregard and override
the will of the majority in order to assure faith in basic constitutional
principles in a pluralistic society. But this presents an inherent conflict with
the concept of majority will and creates tensions in the institutional relationship between the courts and the so-called political branches of government.
Hence, we are cursed with the "countermajoritarian difficulty.""'
Judicial review, in turn, is both celebrated and assailed for its
countermajoritarian elements." 3 To its proponents, judicial review fulfills the
promise of a constitutional democracy by ensuring a mechanism to protect
against the excesses, and sometimes prejudices, of majoritarian will." 4 To its
critics, judicial review is anathema to democratic self-governance, and is the
product of arrogant, elitist decisionmakers, probably influenced by the leftist
academy, overriding populist sentiment on what are essentially political value
choices.' "'
The New Private Law, in comparison, establishes a landscape under which
private decisionmaking bodies take on the institutional role of the judiciary
under constitutional judicial review. Professor Ertman's model, for example,
consciously advocates that small family units will be able to accomplish what
the majority will not permit-legal recognition of alternative family structures
and sexual autonomy." 6 These private decisionmaking bodies can be said to
accomplish similar goals by protecting the rights or will of political minorities
in a manner that balances out public decisions about the allocation of public
goods in most circumstances.' But this makes private lawmakers similarly
"countermajoritarian," and implicates concerns about creating an atomistic
society under which the very concept of community decisions and "public
good" are subsumed by the decentralization of decisionmaking.

112. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (2d ed. 1986)
(describing tension between democratic rule and judicial review); see also JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 4-9 (1980).

113. Compare Kenneth L. Karst, Why Equality Matters, 17 GA. L. REV. 245, 287 (1983) (arguing that judicial review guards against "the majority's worst excesses" and protects important
constitutional values associated with the rights of political minorities) with ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 6-8, 12, 16-17 (1990) (attacking
judicial review as undemocratic imposition of elitist values on the public). For an interesting critique of the conventional mode of thinking about judicial review, see Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1 (1996).
114. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 113, at 287.
115. BORK, supra note 113, at 7 ("[T]he heresy of political judging is systemic. A great many
judges subscribe to it, a large number of left-wing activist groups promote it, many senators insist
upon it, and in the legal academy this heresy is dominant.").
116. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1156-58.
117. Gillette, supra note 2, at 1193-98.
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Moreover, the countermajoritarian element of privatization makes it vulnerable to the same attacks that are directed at activist judicial review, and
these concerns can surely be seen in the essays in this Symposium. First, the
New Private Law could be viewed as an elitist form of governance that circumvents "real" people. Professor Peller's model, for example, arguably promotes opportunities, even in disadvantaged communities, for the intellectual
elite to counteract the dulling forces of public bureaucrats' decisionmaking
about schools. Professor Ertman's contractual model for sexual marginorities
is likely to be available to a class of marginorities that is relatively wealthy
and well educated, positioning them to take full advantage of a sophisticated
contractual regime. And Professor Cheever's model, which requires significant
wealth such that the tax advantages of conservation easements make sense and
access to legal counsel to structure such transactions is possible, can surely be
branded with the elitism label.
Furthermore, ideas of private governance could arguably lead to isolated,
insular, homogeneous communities (e.g., Peller's Afro-centric schools)." 8
While these private lawmakers may serve the ends of individual autonomy,
they also raise Madisonian concerns about insular decisionmaking, factional
control, and the deprivation of choice for others." 9 These concerns exist,
moreover, whether these decisions are made in a town meeting, a corporate
board meeting, or a family meeting.
They also, in the privatization context, raise an additional concern not
present in the judicial review discourse. While federal courts are formally
insulated from the electoral process, they remain accountable to the public in
ways that private lawmakers do not. Accordingly, progressives who view privatization with optimism should be concerned about privatization, even on
their issues. For example, the relative autonomy for family structuring that
might permit sexual marginorities to protect and gain legal recognition for
their relationships may also mean the relative autonomy for parents to "direct
and control the upbringing, education, values and discipline of their children"'2 ° to the exclusion of broader public concerns about matters such as
child abuse.

118. For a fascinating account of the contemporary cultural tendency of homogeneous groups
to form isolated communities, see FRANCES FrrZGERALD, CTES ON A HILL (1986).
119. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison).
120. Proposed Amendment 17 to the Colorado Constitution. In 1996, some Colorado voters
proposed Amendment 17 to the Colorado Constitution through the state initiative process. See
COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(2). The amendment would have made parental control of issues such as
education and discipline an "inalienable" state constitutional right. Michelle D. Johnston, Hidden
Agenda in Amend. 17?, DENY. POST, Nov. 3, 1996, at AO1. Colorado voters defeated the measure
58% to 42%. Michelle D. Johnston, Of the People Faces Hearing on Election Law, DENV. POST,
Nov. 14, 1996, at BOI. As Professor Ertinan herself points out, child sexual abuse does not involve victimless sexual activity, and therefore has moved from public right to criminalization,
consistent with the progressive trend she identifies. Ertman, supra note 8, at 1131-34. Protection
of such activity would accordingly not fit her model. Moreover, the comparison I draw may not
be entirely fair given the clearly unequal legal status of children in a bargaining context as well as
their lack of formal political power. Cf. EDDIE COCHRAN & JERRY CAPEHART, Summertime Blues,
[performed by The Who) on LIVE AT LEEDS (MCA 1970) ("Well I went to my congressman, He
said: 'I'd like to help you son, but you're too young to vote."').
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To the extent that we divorce private decisionmaking from majoritarian
public forces, we also insulate them from constitutional constraint, public
accountability, and public discourse. 2' If the public and private are treated
as formally different, those differences may obscure issues or background
principles that are more critical to assessing law and its outcomes.' I return
to the point about accountability and public discourse when I address the "subversive" nature of the New Private Law below.
Like activist judicial interference with democratic choice, then, the move
toward privatization for progressive purposes can be seen as a reflection of
dissatisfaction with pluralistic decisionmaking. The criticism of public versus
private allocation of goods is likely to turn, as with assaults on activist judicial
review, on whose ox is being gored.'23 These critiques are not new, and to
some extent reflect a Realist acknowledgement of the subjective nature of
legal decisionmaking.
B.

The Partingon the Right, Is Now a Parting on the Left"4

As illustrated through the articles in this Symposium, the New Private
Law does not explicitly draw on a particular political theory. Thus, another
manner in which the New Private Law could be said to be "new" is in its lack
of political valence. That is, depending on the context, new forms of private
governance may be used to advance objectives of any ideological color. The
political leanings of the New Private Law's advocates may vary, as with the
public/private distinction arguments, depending upon the policy outcomes
sought.
On this view, the New Private Law establishes an analytical framework
that challenges traditional conceptions of the privileging of private institutions.
Contemporary understanding suggests that protection of the private realm
advanced conservative agendas by protecting the status quo. 2 ' In contrast,
several of the commentators here argue that the newness of the New Private
Law is in the idea that private governance may possibly lead to progressive
outcomes.

121. Daniel A. Farber, Whither Socialism?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1011, 1014-15 (1996).
122. Karl E. Klare, The Public/PrivateDistinction in Labor Law, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1358,
1361 (1982) (arguing that the public/private "rhetoric obscures rather than illuminates, and that the
social function of the public/private distinction is to repress aspirations for alternative political arrangements").
123. See ELY, supra note 112, at I (observing that terms such as activism and self-restraint
are not indigenous to either interpretivist or noninterpretivist methodologies of constitutional interpretation). Moreover, both liberal and conservative constitutional theorists sometimes seek to legitimize their conceptions of judicial review with reference to external principles. See generally
George A. Martinez, The New Wittgensteinians and the End of Jurisprudence, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 545, 556-57 (1996) (describing theoretical approaches of both Ronald Dworkin and Robert
Bork as bearing common characteristic of constraining constitutional inquiry by reference to external principles).
124. In keeping with making this essay reflect contemporary political transformation, the
original phrase has been reversed. The actual line is, "The parting on the left, is now a parting on
the right." TOwNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
125. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 712.
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Under the New Private Law, moreover, private is not inherently bad, and
public is not inherently good (or, at least, not inherently better). Professor
Peller sees in privatization new educational opportunities for traditionally
disempowered constituencies. 126 Professors Ertman and Cheever adopt private contractual models for the achievement of what may be said to be leftleaning substantive agendas-the securing of autonomy for victimless sexual
activity and alternative family structures and the preservation of open space,
respectively.'27 Roberto Corrada argues that there is no political valence to
the New Private Law, that the theoretical frameworks that it provides can be
used to the advantage of the left or the right. 2 Under this view, the progressive scholars of the New Private Law may have some sympathy for the
Devil' 29 -i.e., for the private ordering of goods. In contrast to these authors,
Professor Stone and, to a lesser extent Professor Welle, identify sound reasons
to be skeptical about private law and its ability to protect broader public interests. 3 ° Their essays capture the traditional concerns about private law as obscuring or impairing rights, or at least having the strong potential to do so.
But surely the lack of a singular political ideology cannot be the source of
this jurisprudential movement's newness. Again, this is old boss stuff. A conventional understanding of other recognized jurisprudential schools of legal
thought is that they provide similar "big tents" that accommodate radically
different political/ideological visions, yet share a common, unifying analytical
approach. For example, extreme differences as to normative outcomes exist
among Law and Economics scholars, depending upon how the particular
scholar assigns utility to various interests. The fact that Law and Economics
theory suggests that legal rules should be designed to further social utility or
wealth maximization, doesn't mean that uniformity exists about the definition
of wealth. 3' More progressive economic theorists could say, and have, that
the normative goals of legal rules should include the maximization of nonfinancial utilities as well.'
Similarly, feminist theory also encompasses perspectives arguably as variant as the differing experiences of individual women.'33 As Gary Minda has
126. Peller, supra note 65, at 1008-09. In her thoughtful essay, Nancy Ehrenreich identifies
the "progressive" potential of privatization on a number of different levels. Ehrenreich, supra note
8, at 1240-51. She does not, however, contend that this potential might constitute an element of a
new jurisprudential movement.
127. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1087-92; Ertman, supra note 8, at 1137-44.
128. Corrada, supra note 8, at 1054-55.
129. MICK JAGGER & KEITH RICHARD, Sympathy for the Devil, on BEGGARS BANQUET (Lon-

don 1968).
130. Stone, supra note 2, at 1036-43; Welle, supra note 87, at 1225-29.
131.

See, e.g., DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND

ECONOMICS 9 (1992) (explaining that gross domestic product may be too narrow a measure of
social well-being because it does not account for valued "goods" such as clean air, privacy, and
leisure time).
132. See, e.g., Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Relaxing Traditional Economic Assumptions and
Values: Toward a New Multi-DisciplinaryDiscourse on Law, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 181 (1991).
Moreover, this reflects the highly utilitarian and pragmatic nature of law and economics theory.
See, e.g., David W. Barnes, Economics 2001: A Carpenter'sOdyssey, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 197
(1991) (arguing that law and economics is a "hammer" that can be used to build any kind of
house).
133. Minda, supra note 9, at 624 (noting that "[like CLS, there may be no single 'feminist
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observed, "Today there are feminist legal scholars who could be characterized
as conservative, liberal-center, or left-radical."'' 3 4 Furthermore, New Public
Law scholarship represents a broad range of approaches to legal problems,
rather than a unified analytical construct. 35 Indeed, one of its defining characteristics, to those who have identified it as a movement, is that it incorporates a multi-faceted analytical approach that encourages discourse among
traditionally opposed disciplines.' 36
Finally, the fact that the New Private Law shares the characteristic of "no
inherent political valence" with recognized jurisprudential movements does not
itself make the New Private Law an independent perspective. While this may
be a characteristic of jurisprudential movements, it is certainly not a defining
characteristic.
Perhaps the confusion surrounding the argument that privatization can
serve progressive as well as conservative ends stems from a basic element of
the politics of privatization. During the 1980s, a political slogan often invoked
by political leaders on the left was that the increasingly conservative Republican Party sought to "get government out of the boardroom, and into the bedroom."

37

The point, of course, was that a political party whose rallying cry

was filled with small government rhetoric and the notion of reducing
government's role in the regulation of private business, was also made up of
people who endorsed state interference with private conduct in the personal
and social realm. A reverse criticism could naturally be employed to attack the
liberal/progressive politicians, who (arguably) desired the reverse.
It may well be that if the privatization movement has no political valence,
it is because directly competing visions of the (broadly defined) private do.
That is, conservative politicians wish to protect the private decisionmaking
realm of commercial and financial activities, while relatively progressive politicians wish to privilege private decisionmaking in the social and personal
realm. It should not be surprising, therefore, to come to understand that the
same vision of private ordering-reduction of government involvement and
allocation to transaction-oriented individuals-might protect either political
vision of privacy. 3 '

method' or 'feminist epistemology' which can be identified to characterize feminist legal theory").
134. Id.
135. Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 784-87.
136. Id. at 787-90; Farber & Frickey, supra note 38, at 905-06.
137. The origins of this slogan have eluded me. For a useful general reference, see J. M.
Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1119, 1138 (1990)
("Conservatives have pressed for deregulation of business interests while simultaneously advocat-

ing regulation of reproductive interests. The systematic difference in conservative arguments re-

garding the sanctity of freedoms in the boardroom and the bedroom is a helpful insight into the
sources of traditional conservative ideology, just as the opposing orientations in liberal thought
allow us to understand its characteristic ideological features."). For a thoughtful discussion of the
same political dichotomy, see Mnookin, supra note 101, at 1430-34 (describing competing conservative and liberal political visions of the private).

138. Admittedly, this observation does not translate as well to the work of Professors Cheever

and Peller, which does not emphasize the private realm for the purpose of protecting personal privacy.
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"You Can't Always Get What You Want, but...
You Just Might Find You Get What You Need"'39

Finally, the New Private Law could be said to be the possibility of
achieving progressive goals through subversive mechanisms, of transforming
legal thought by changing our fundamental understanding of legal institutions-of, as has been said, using the master's tools to destroy the master's
house."4 But I take issue with this aspect of private law's newness as well.
First, the notion of using historically "conservative" tools to accomplish more
liberal agendas seems fundamentally more like an application of utilitarianism
than a new mode of legal thought. Second, the subversive nature of the New
Private Law resurrects for me concerns about the false obfuscation of the
public/private distinction and the nature of political and jurisprudential discourse.
As an illustration of the "subversive" potential of the New Private Law,
let us examine Professor Ertman's and Professor Cheever's innovative approaches to addressing critical social issues through alternative legal structures.
Martha Ertman argues that contractual freedom may offer liberty to sexual
marginorities who are otherwise unable to obtain public rights in the ordinary
political process. Her ideal, of course, would be a regime under which alternative family structures could be recognized and protected as a public right.
The functional aspect of her approach is in identifying a system under which
private ordering could achieve many, but not all, of the benefits the public
right would provide. Private ordering is, for her, a way station on the road to
full public recognition of rights. Or, stated differently, her proposal could be
characterized as a step-by-step approach to the ultimate "heaven" of public
41
rights.'
Fred Cheever's conservation easements proposal is similarly pragmatic. In
a world where political efforts to protect broader "public" rights compete with
the moneyed interests of land developers, a coherent plan for preservation of
open space may seem like an unattainable goal. Through the magic of conservation easements and tax breaks, however, the state's role in ensuring environmental protection becomes obscured. Even the participants think they are
42
pulling off something private!
These essays provide an interesting and insightful way to approach these
particular issues, but somehow do not rise to the level of new jurisprudential
theory. Rather, they suggest utilitarian structures that operate within the law to
accomplish identified social benefits. In other words, while Professors Ertman

139. MICK JAGGER & KEITH RICHARD, You Can't Always Get What You Want, on LET IT
BLEED (London 1969). For different legal interpretations of these lyrics, see Chen, supra note 5, at
321 n.67 (listing uses of this song in legal literature).
140. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1233 (citing Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never
Dismantle the Master's House, in SISTER OUTrSIDER 112 (1984)); Ertman, supra note 8, at 1165

(same).
Cf. ROBERT PLANT & JIMMY PAGE, Stairway to Heaven, on (UNTITLED) (Atlantic 1971).
142. Cheever, supra note 8, at 1090-92. While this is consistent with Professor Cheever's
characterization of magic as "sleight of hand," id. at 1078, it also provides my arguments about
the utilitarian nature of the New Private Law with greater force.
141.
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and Cheever offer creative and exciting scenarios for social change, their approaches reflect and apply a long-standing tradition in legal thought. Their43
proposals are strongly reminiscent of the concept of legal functionalism,
which incorporates to some degree the idea that the legal system may be examined in light of its ability to adapt to changing social needs.'" Moreover,
the utilitarian elements of the New Private Law are strongly reminiscent of the
Realist tradition of law as a tool for social change. 45 Similarly, in his remarks, Dan Farber pointed out a connection between the New Private Law and
pragmatism."
Beyond the utilitarianism issue, the subversive potential of the New Private Law, recognized by Martha Ertman, Nancy Ehrenreich, and Roberto
Corrada, is surely a fascinating element of the discussion. In their papers, they
maintain that it could be the notion that the left could coopt a traditionally
conservative tool that provides the new or unconventional jurisprudential perspective I have been seeking.'47 Through this lens, the law itself is transformed by the radical and surreptitious subversion of the master's tools.
One wonders, however, about the ramifications of this subversiveness. For
the subversiveness my colleagues propose is not simply derived from the coopting of conservative rhetoric for leftist causes. The subversiveness they celebrate derives directly from the lack of public attention and accountability for
the policies generated by the New Private Law. While majoritarian moral
opposition might preclude recognition of a public right of gay marriage, closeting the legal recognition of gay and lesbian relationships in the rhetoric of
contract evades that political problem. While developers' lobbyists may torpedo comprehensive federal land use regulation in the halls of Congress, the
New Private Lawyers will be carrying out similar, if disconnected, policies in
the halls of county recorders' offices.
These new rights will be recognized because hiding them in the private
realm will ensure that public objection to their existence or recognition will be
obscured. But this attraction to the subversive, as Katherine Van Wezel Stone
shows in the labor law context, may as easily result in the diminishment of
rights rather than their expansion. If the New Private Law has no political
valence, neither does the subversive achievement of atomistic private interests
outside of the public eye.
The subversiveness of New Private Law, moreover, may in the long run
be more of a concern for the left than for the right. Subversiveness in the
context of private governance means that no accountability will exist for privatized decisions affecting broader public interests." Public dialogue is likewise obscured if decisions on what collectively are important matters of public

143. See generally Robert W. Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57, 75-81
(1984) (describing and critiquing strong legal functionalism tradition reflected in both Formalism
and Realism).
144. Id.
145. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 688-89.
146. Farber, supra note 121, at 1012-13.
147. PETE TOwNSHEND, The Seeker, on MEATY, BEATY, BIG AND BOUNCY (Decca 1972).
148. This point is made quite nicely by Elaine Welle. Welle, supra note 87, at 1233.
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concern are made in decentralized private realms. Such obfuscation historically
has not been a positive element for the left.
What this means is that the New Private Law, like the old private law,
likely obscures the fundamental substantive decisions that most affect society
and misdirects attention toward the public or private institutions that implement those decisions. More to the point, whether or not subversiveness should
be valued, we can view the New Private Law through an old jurisprudential
lens.
Thus, the New Private Law is likely to raise concerns already reflected in
the existing legal thought on private law and the public/private distinction. It
will provoke continued discussion of what makes the public and private realms
different, and of the role of discourse and accountability in the contemporary
privatization movement. Furthermore, as Dan Farber points out, an important
element of exploring the New Private Law is identifying the background legal
principles against which it must operate, particularly regarding constitutional
law. 49 But all this was true of the old private law as well.
IV. "I'LL Tip MY HAT TO THE NEW CONSTITUTION, TAKE A Bow FOR THE
NEW REVOLUTION"'5 °

Before concluding, I must acknowledge that there exist sound critiques of
my own critique. I place these potential weaknesses in my own position in
three broad categories.
First, none of the papers here expressly takes on the role of constructing
the broader jurisprudential arguments I attempt to dismantle. Rather, I have set
up three rather weak straw persons in order to prove my point. A deeper, more
reflective examination of the New Private Law might reveal differences that I
have overlooked.
Moreover, there is a good reason for the absence of a sort of comprehensive examination of the markers of New Private Law. One of the hallmarks of
the Denver University Law Review Symposia has been the examination of
broad problems of legal theory by contextualizing the examination.'
By
disaggregating theory across various legal contexts, we have hoped that a more
satisfying comprehensive analysis can be produced or reconstructed. The contextual format of the Symposium does not lend itself to unifying approaches to
legal theory, although that is the ultimate goal. But that is not a response to
the lack of a unifying theory for New Private Law. If transformations occur

149. Farber, supra note 121, at 1014-15. Indeed, the examination is already beginning. See,
e.g., Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L.
REv. 1169 (1995).
150. TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.
151. 1 owe this particular idea to Julie Nice from conversations we have had about this Symposium. For a description of the contextual format of the Denver University Law Review Symposium, see Julie A. Nice, Making Conditions Constitutional by Attaching Them to Welfare: The
Dangers of Selective Contextual Ignorance of the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 72 DENV.

U. L. REv. 971, 971-72 (1995).
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within subsets of doctrine, they do not necessarily identify a movement, which
152
should be a way of approaching law universally across contexts.
Another possible limitation on my analysis is that it may simply be too
early to identify a distinct jurisprudential movement. It may be that the New
Private Law is not new yet, because the innovative ideas described in the
essays presented here are simply too new. That is, these ideas may be at the
forefront of a movement in legal thought that is still emerging. The New Public Law Symposium had the luxury of looking back on a generation of scholarship. Perhaps my generation' 53 of legal scholars, or the next, will one day
look back upon the scholarship of the next thirty years and discover that, indeed, this was the beginning of something. I remain skeptical that this will
occur, but surely cannot foreclose its possibility.
Finally, I am vulnerable to an argument that it may not be useful or
meaningful to attempt to identify entire "schools" of legal thought. One might
challenge the legitimacy of this enterprise, particularly in a postmodem world.
The idea of attempting to classify the legal theory underlying these essays into
a taxonomy of legal thought may be an ultimately fruitless task. Intellectual
thought cannot be so easily divided into neat categories, but discourse is part
of a "seamless web" of ideas that are continuously evolving.'54
Perhaps legal scholars would be expending their time and energy more
productively by examining trends and ideas in legal thought and how they
relate to broader schools, rather than worrying about whether they fit into a
new school. There are new aspects to the New Private Law essays, although
they build (as do all theories) on existing schools. It may be more useful to
draw from this work general theoretical assumptions that will help us better
understand the system of law.'55 Moreover, if a new strand of thought
emerges from New Private Law, it is possible in the course of its evolution
that its important ideas will be absorbed into existing schools.' 56 Thus, I
must at least qualify my arguments to reflect the idea that transformation of
legal thought is an ongoing, evolutionary process.

152. Shane, supra note 9, at 840-41.
153.

PETE TOWNSHEND, My Generation, on THE WHO SINGS MY GENERATION (Decca 1966).

Unlike the Who, however, we simply hope to get published before we get old. Cf id. ("I hope I
die before I get old.").
154. Professors Eskridge and Peller made a similar point in their discussion of the New Public Law. They stated that perhaps a "more interesting inquiry" than examining whether a new
school existed, was how the trends it reflected related to the politicization of jurisprudence.
Eskridge & Peller, supra note 12, at 707, 761-90. They observed that the New Public Law movement could be characterized as "an attempt to mediate the ideological polarization of legal discourse" and in that respect represented centrism as a sort of postmodem cultural form. Id. at 764,
787-90.
155. For example, rather than attempt to fit the New Private Law into a broader jurisprudential framework, Nancy Ehrenreich takes a different approach. She argues that, even acknowledging
the validity of the conventional critique of the public/private distinction, contemporary privatization reforms may peel away the veneer of that distinction by forcing the right to acknowledge that
private choice is ultimately the product of public decisionmaking. As such, new forms of private
governance may provoke the subversion of socially-constructed cultural categories in a manner
that encourages a more honest discourse about public policy. Ehrenreich, supra note 8, at 1251.
156. Minda, supra note 9, at 599 (describing trend of new idea being incorporated into exist-

ing modes of legal thought).
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While all this may be true, I believe that it is surely also worthwhile to
attempt to fit these theories into an organized body of knowledge about broader categories of legal thought. The same arguments could be made about the
well-recognized schools of legal thought, which themselves hardly represent a
monolithic or unitary vision of law even within the broader systemic views
that make them distinct.
I have been unable to identify the precise characteristics that differentiate
this movement in any significant way that would justify its designation as a
new jurisprudential school, and have been unable to infer this from the other
work in this issue. Long live law, be it public or private.'57 Karl Llewelyn,
meet Pete Townshend. As legal scholars, we must examine ideas with appropriate levels of critique and skepticism-the only way to ensure we Won't Get
Fooled Again.' 8

157. Cf. PETE TOWNSHEND, Long Live Rock, on ODDS & SODS (MCA 1974) ("Long live
rock, be it dead or alive.").
158. TOWNSHEND, Won't Get Fooled Again, supra note 3.

